estimate the dynamic response of labor market variables to technological shocks. They show that investment-specific shocks imply predominantly an adjustment along the intensive margin (i.e., hours per worker), whereas for neutral shocks the largest share of the adjustment takes place along the extensive margin (i.e., employment). In this paper we develop a New Keynesian model featuring capital accumulation, two margins of labor adjustment and a hiring cost. The model is used to analyze a novel economic mechanism to explain that evidence.
Introduction
The effect of neutral technology shocks on labor input has received much attention in macroeconomics. For instance, the seminal paper by Galí (1999) estimates a negative response of per capita hours after a positive shock to total factor productivity by means of a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model identified through a long-run restriction. The latter can be justified in a large class of business cycle models including both Real Business Cycle and New Keynesian models. That empirical result questions the relevance of technology shocks as the main driving force of aggregate fluctuations, for in the data hours worked is pro-cyclical. Nominal rigidities in the form of sticky prices and/or sticky wages as in Galí (1999) or real rigidities in the form of habit persistence and capital adjustment costs, as in Francis and Ramey (2005) , can explain that empirical evidence in the context of modern dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. 1 Canova, López-Salido, and Michelacci (2010 Michelacci ( , 2012 have refined the empirical evidence on the propagation of technological shocks on labor market variables by allowing adjustment along both the intensive margin (i.e., hours per worker) and the extensive margin (i.e., employment). Using an SVAR model identified through long-run restrictions as in Fisher (2006) , they arrive at the following estimation result. Labor input contracts along both margins in the aftermath of a positive neutral technology shock, and the largest share of that adjustment takes place along the extensive margin. They also investigate the effects of investment-specific technology shocks and find that they have an expansionary effect on total hours. In this case, however, the corresponding adjustment results predominantly from changes along the intensive margin.
The present paper shows that the empirical evidence described above can be explained within a New Keynesian set-up with labor market frictions. In fact, the proposed model has only two additional features with respect to the standard textbook New Keynesian model: capital accumulation, since we are interested in analyzing dynamic consequences of investment-specific shocks, and labor market frictions with two margins of adjustment, since we want to study the split across the two margins. Our theoretical explanation for the relative importance of the two margins of labor adjustment in response to the two alternative forms of technological shocks is novel and surprisingly simple. In our model, adjustment along the extensive margin is an inter-temporal decision. The reason is that employment relationships are costly to establish. Firms will therefore optimally choose to hire, if the shock to total factor productivity is persistent enough. On the other hand, adjustment along the intensive margin is an intra-temporal decision. An expansionary investment-specific technology shock therefore incentivizes firms to mostly rely on hours to adjust to the shock. The reason is the additional investment demand in the economy, and the associated short-run extra need for labor input resulting from this shock.
Let us relate our results to those in the literature. Sveen and Weinke (2009) have analyzed the role of labor adjustment at both the intensive and the extensive margin for inflation dynamics in the aftermath of monetary policy shocks. In the present paper we extend that framework to make it suitable for an analysis of our new research questions. As explained in the previous paragraph, those questions regard the dynamic consequences of technological shocks. Our results point at an alternative to the theoretical mechanism proposed by Michelacci and López-Salido (2007) . Those authors have developed a business cycle model with labor market frictions, in the context of which neutral technological progress prompts waves of Schumpeterian creative destruction. Their analysis offers an interesting theoretical explanation of the empirical evidence on the propagation of technological shocks on labor market variables. Compared with their work our explanation combines, however, features which are fairly standard in DSGE modeling of business cycle fluctuations. Another strand of the recent literature integrates labor market frictions into fully-fledged medium-scale DSGE models that are suitable for model estimation (see, e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Trabandt 2016) . Our focus is more specific. We use a relatively simple model to illustrate how a small set of assumptions that are standard in the DSGE literature helps explain the dynamic consequences of alternative technological shocks for labor market variables of interest. Our paper therefore conducts a positive analysis and this differentiates it from the recent contributions with a normative focus (see, e.g., Galí 2011) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses our results and Section 4 concludes.
The model
Our New Keynesian model features labor market frictions and two margins of labor adjustment as in Sveen and Weinke (2009) . In addition, we allow for endogenous capital accumulation subject to a convex capital adjustment cost. In what follows we analyze the optimal choices on the part of households and firms, and we close our model by specifying a conventional form of monetary policy.
Households
There is a continuum of households and each of them consists of a large number of family members. Within each household full consumption risk sharing is assumed. 2 Each period some family members are unemployed while others work for firms. Each member has the following period utility function
where parameter η denotes the inverse of the labor supply elasticity, and parameter χ is a scaling parameter to be used in the calibration of our model. H t indicates hours worked in period t. A continuum of goods represented by the interval [0, 1] is assumed, and we have used the definition ≡ (∫ 1 0 ( ) −1 ) −1 , with ( ) denoting the quantity of good i consumed in period t. C t therefore represents consumption purchases of the composite good, defined as a Dixit-Stiglitz aggregate over purchases of each of the continuum of goods, with ϵ > 1 denoting the elasticity of substitution between the different goods. The household is assumed to maximize the average utility of its members, subject to a sequence of budget constraints of the form
where ≡ (∫ 1 0 ( ) 1− ) 1 1− is the price index. It is assumed that the household accumulates capital, and I t denotes investment purchases of composite good (with the same constant elasticity of substitution ϵ as for consumption purchases). There exists a one-period nominal discount bond, and each bond pays one unit of numéraire at maturity. Its time t purchases (at a price Q t ) are indicated by D t . Let us also notice here that the gross nominal interest rate, R t , is inversely related to the bond price. The capital stock, K t , is rented out to firms and the real rental price of capital is . The household's labor income results from the real wage, W t , hours worked, H t , and employment, N t . We have also used the definition ≡ 1 − for period t unemployment, and B t is the real unemployment benefit. Finally, T t denotes nominal transfers, including dividends resulting from ownership of firms. The law-of-motion of capital is of the form
where parameter δ is meant to indicate the rate of depreciation. We also assume a convex capital adjustment cost. More concretely, the additional capital in period t + 1 resulting from investment spending in the amount I t is given by , Ψ ( ) , with Z I, t denoting the level of investment-specific technology. Ψ (⋅) is an increasing and concave function, the concavity implying the existence of adjustment costs. It is also assumed that Ψ ( ) = and Ψ ′ ( ) = 1. Near the steady state a marginal unit of investment spending therefore increases the capital stock by an equal amount, i.e. there is no capital adjustment cost in the steady state of our model. Finally, we have Ψ ′′ ( ) = −1 , with parameter ϵ ψ denoting the elasticity of the investment-to-capital ratio with respect to marginal Q, evaluated in steady state. In our log-linear approximation to the equilibrium dynamics, ϵ ψ is the parameter indexing the degree of adjustment costs. A similar approach to characterize a capital adjustment cost can be found in Woodford (2005) . Later in the text, we will use the notation Ψ t for Ψ ( ), and Ψ ′ for Ψ ′ ( ).
The consumer Euler equation implied by this structure reads
where Λ , +1 ≡ +1 is the real stochastic discount factor. Moreover, we obtain an optimality condition for capital accumulation of the form
where ≡ 1 , Ψ ′ (the marginal Q) can be interpreted as the period t value of having an additional unit of capital in period t + 1. This value is measured in terms of the period t composite good.
Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms, indexed on the unit interval. Each firm i produces one good, ( ), out of the continuum of goods using a technology of the form
where ( ) is the number of employees in firm i, and ( ) indicates hours worked by each employee, while ( ) is the capital stock used in production. Finally, Z t is the level of neutral technology. We assume constant returns to scale and a capital share of ∈ (0, 1). Cost minimization on the part of households and firms implies that demand for good i is given by
where ≡ (∫ 1 0 ( ) −1 ) −1 denotes aggregate output. The law of motion of employment is given by
where ( ) is the number of vacancies posted by firm i in period t, and parameter s denotes the separation rate. We have also used the definition Φ ( / ) ≡ ( / ) − , with V t denoting aggregate vacancies, and ≡ 1−(1 − ) −1 are household members looking for jobs at the beginning of period t. Parameter γ indicates the matching elasticity, and ς is a measure of the efficiency of the matching technology. Our model combines a cost of posting vacancies (i.e., a pre-match hiring cost) with a hiring cost that depends on the size of the labor adjustment along the extensive margin. The latter cost component is supposed to capture training costs (i.e., post-match hiring costs). Both microeconomic 3 and macroeconomic evidence 4 reveals the quantitative importance of post-match hiring costs. Concretely, we assume the following labor adjustment cost
with (1) = ′ (1) = 0, and ′′ (1) = , where parameter ϵ n indicates the labor-adjustment cost in our log-linear approximation to the equilibrium dynamics. Moreover there is a cost 1− , of posting a vacancy, where parameter c is a constant that is used in the calibration. Both costs are measured in units of the composite good. Finally, the Calvo restriction on price adjustment states that each period a lottery takes place and with probability (1 − ) a firm gets to re-optimize its price, whereas with probability θ the firm posts its last period's price. Since households are assumed to be the ultimate owners of the firms in the economy, firms use the stochastic discount factor to discount future profits. A firm's problem therefore reads
The first-order condition for price-setting is standard
where ≡ −1 denotes the frictionless markup. Firm i's real marginal cost, ( ), is of the form
which reflects that firms take rationally into account that with wage bargaining (the details of which will be explained in the next subsection) a marginal increase in hours worked per worker increases the real wage. At the margin, the cost of using hours worked and rented capital must be the same. This yields
Combining the first-order conditions for employment and vacancy posting implies
where Ξ ≡ 1− , Φ( / ) can be interpreted as the cost of hiring one additional worker. This value is measured in terms of the period t composite good. Equation (13) reflects the fact that hiring is a forward-looking decision. The left hand side gives the marginal cost of integrating one additional worker into the workforce. This cost consists of the associated hiring cost, the cost of adjusting the workforce, and the wage income. The right hand side gives the marginal benefit from having an additional worker: the cost savings resulting from having a larger workforce, and the continuation value. The latter consists of future savings in hiring costs, as well as changes in the future cost of adjusting the workforce.
Wage negotiation
The wage negotiation takes the form considered in Sveen and Weinke (2009) . Specifically, we follow Ravenna and Walsh (2008) and Blanchard and Galí (2010) and assume that newly hired workers become productive instantaneously. The period value of a match (with firm i) for a worker, expressed in consumption units,̃( ), is of the form̃(
where ≡ Φ( / ) is the job-finding probability, and̃is the value of being unemployed after hiring has taken place. It is given bỹ=
where ≡ 1− , is the unemployment benefit, and the value of the average match is̃≡ ∫ 1 0̃( ) ( ) . The period value of the match for a worker consists of the associated real wage income taking into account the utility cost of working expressed in consumption units. In addition, the match gives a continuation value for the worker. With probability (1 − s) the worker will still work at firm i in period t + 1, and in case the worker separates from firm i, she can find a job at another firm (with probability F t+1 ). Otherwise, she will receive the unemployment benefit. The value of being unemployed (after hiring has taken place) can be interpreted in an analogous way. In period t the worker receives an unemployment benefit, and in addition she obtains a continuation value. The value of a match for firms,̃, corresponds to the cost of hiring a worker = Ξ .
The reason is that newly hired workers become productive instantaneously so that a firm can hire another worker if negotiations break down. Nash wage bargaining implies a first-order condition of the form
where (1 − ) denotes the weight of workers in the bargain. All household members who work therefore receive the same value from a match, irrespective of which firm a household member works for. This is, again, a consequence of instantaneous hiring. Combining (14) and (15), we arrive at the following expression for the gain from working compared to being unemployed
Hence any wage differences across firms result from differences in hours worked only. In fact, the real wage income compensates for the disutility derived from hours worked (expressed in consumption units), since the gain from working is equal across all firms. We can use (16) and (18) to substitute for̃and̃−̃in equation (17). This implies
where
Finally, using equation (19), it can be seen that firm i's real marginal cost satisfies
This shows that the bargained wage is privately efficient, i.e., the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure relative to labor productivity is relevant for the determination of firm i's real marginal cost.
Equilibrium
The aggregate goods market clearing condition reads
while value added, GDP t , is defined as GDP t ≡ C t + I t . We assume that the central bank follows a Taylor rule of the form
where ρ R is meant to indicate the degree of interest rate smoothing, and parameter ϕ π measures the responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to changes in inflation. Finally, the exogenous processes Z I,t and Z t measure the respective levels of investment-specific and neutral technology. They follow stationary autoregressive processes of the form
with ρ I , ∈ (0, 1) and ε I,t , ε Z,t denoting the respective innovations in those processes. In order to be consistent with the identifying assumptions in the SVARs estimated by Michelacci (2010, 2012) we would need to consider permanent technological shocks. It is well understood, however, that monetary DSGE models featuring permanent technological shocks need to combine a wide variety of nominal and real rigidities in order to imply an empirically plausible inflation response to those shocks (see, e.g., Smets and Wouters 2007) . Our goal in the present paper is more limited. We wish to isolate the economic mechanisms through which technological shocks can affect labor market variables, and we therefore stick to a relatively simple model featuring transitory technological shocks. Appendix A gives the full set of linearized equilibrium conditions implied by our model. 5 Since employment is a firm-specific state variable in the context of our model the coefficient pre-multiplying the average real marginal cost in the linearized inflation equation is computed by using the method developed in Woodford (2005) . 6 The details are explained in Appendix B.
Results
All quantitative results are based on calibrations. We therefore start by discussing our baseline parameter values.
Baseline calibration
We consider a quarterly model. The discount factor, β, is set to 0.99, which implies an annual steady state real interest rate of about 4 per cent. The elasticity of substitution between goods, ϵ, is set to 7. This implies a steadystate mark-up of about 20 per cent. Our baseline value for the Calvo parameter, θ, is 0.75, i.e., firms change their prices on average once a year. Monetary policy is assumed to take a conventional form. More concretely, we set τ π = 1.5 and ρ r = 0.95. The labor supply elasticity, 1/η, takes the value 0.3, which is in line with the estimates reported in Card (1994) . The separation rate, s, is assumed to take the value 0.1, the unemployment benefit, B, is set to 40% of steady state real labor income, the matching function elasticity, γ, is set to 0.6, and the bargaining power parameter, ϕ, equals 0.5. The latter four choices are consistent with the evidence reported in Shimer (2005) , and the references therein. The labor adjustment cost, ϵ n , takes the value 2, which is in line with the estimate reported in Cooper and Willis (2009) . We impose that hours worked in steady state correspond to 1/3 of available time. Period unemployment is set to 0.06, and we let the quarterly job-filling rate be 0.7. This is achieved by an appropriate choice of parameters χ, ς, and c. For the remaining parameters we also choose conventional values. Specifically, the depreciation rate, δ, is assumed to take the value 0.025, and the capital share, α, is set to 0.33. As to the elasticity of the investment-to-capital ratio with respect to marginal Q, it is assumed = 1 20 * . Finally, we assume = = 0.9, a setting associated with persistent technological processes.
Quantitative results
We analyze the relative importance of the two margins of labor adjustment in response to the two alternative forms of technological shocks under consideration. This is illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2 . They show, respectively, the dynamic responses of several macro variables to a one percent shock to neutral and investmentspecific technology. The rate of inflation is annualized. All other variables are measured as the respective log deviation of the original variable from its steady state value. As illustrated in Figure 1 , labor input decreases in response to a positive neutral technology shock. That result accords with the evidence in Galí (1999) . As explained there, the intuition is simple. Sticky prices imply a sluggish response of aggregate demand to neutral technology shocks. Most importantly, the fact that adjustment occurs primarily along the extensive margin is in line with the empirical results in Michelacci (2010, 2012) . In a way consistent with standard results in the New Keynesian literature (see, e.g., Galí 2015, 72) inflation and the real wage decrease in response to a positive neutral technology shock, even though output expands. In the context of our model, the output response takes a hump-shaped form. This is another consequence of the sluggish response of aggregate demand to the neutral technology shock. In particular, capital builds up only gradually for this economic reason. Figure 2 displays impulse responses for the same macro variables, as implied by an investment-specific technology shock. Consistent with the evidence in Fisher (2006) labor input increases in response to a positive investment-specific technology shock, and also in this case, our theoretical result is consistent with the corresponding empirical findings in Michelacci (2010, 2012) . In fact, conditional on an investment-specific technology shock our model predicts that the adjustment occurs predominantly through the intensive margin of labor adjustment. A key aspect of that shock is that firms can only take advantage of it by investing. This explains why investment, output, inflation and the real wage all increase in the aftermath of an investment-specific technology shock. Our main result regards the share of labor adjustment along the intensive vs. the extensive margin, in response to alternative technological shocks. It is therefore important to quantify those adjustments. To this end, we compute for each shock the average employment share
where n i and h i indicate the log-deviations of employment and hours from their respective steady state values, i quarters after the shock. The measure s N,x is useful for our purposes, since the technological shocks under consideration imply labor adjustments along the two margins which are of the same sign in exactly those cases that we are most interested in. Based on this simple measure, we can confirm that investmentspecific shocks imply predominantly an adjustment along the intensive margin, whereas for neutral shocks the largest share of the adjustment takes place along the extensive margin. In fact, for x = 4,8,12 we compute , = [ 0.6152 0.6720 0.6928 ] from the impulse responses to a neutral technology shock, whereas from the impulse responses to an investment-specific technology shock we obtain , = [ 0.4164 0.4137 0.4001 ]. The intuition behind the relative importance of the two margins of labor adjustment in response to the two alternative forms of technological shocks under consideration is straightforward. Employment relationships are costly to establish in our model. The extensive margin of labor adjustment to an economic shock is therefore quantitatively important, if the shock makes a long-term adjustment worthwhile. But this is the case for a persistent shock to total factor productivity. On the other hand, an expansionary investment-specific technology shock incentivizes firms to use the more flexible hours margin to adjust to the shock. The reason is that firms can only take advantage of this shock by investing. But additional investment demand in the economy creates a short-run extra need for labor input, which makes it optimal for firms to use predominantly the more flexible hours margin in their adjustment to the shock.
It is instructive to compare those economic mechanisms to the ones proposed by Michelacci and López-Salido (2007) . In their model technological shocks can prompt waves of Schumpeterian destruction. The idea is that technological progress can make old jobs obsolete. In the short-run, employment can therefore decrease in response to a positive technological shock. The extent to which this occurs depends on various other aspects of the model. In particular, the degree of labor market frictions is important for the quantitative relevance of relocations between obsolete and technologically advanced jobs. Moreover, the extent to which investment is needed to bring about technological improvement of existing jobs matters for the short-run employment response to a technological shock. The reason is that the increase in the marginal utility of consumption (associated with an increase in investment) increases the value of an existing job, for any given level of technology. The authors show that in response to a positive neutral technology shock employment decreases, whereas it increases in response to an investment-specific technology shock. This is an interesting theoretical explanation of the empirical evidence on the propagation of technological shocks on labor market variables. The present paper offers, however, an alternative economic mechanism to explain those empirical regularities, and it is fair to say that compared with Michelacci and López-Salido (2007) our explanation combines features which are standard in modern DSGE models. The comparison between our results and those in Michelacci and López-Salido (2007) would, however, be incomplete without pointing at the following difference. In the last section of their paper they extend the baseline model along several dimensions. Most importantly, from the viewpoint of the analyses conducted in the present paper, they develop a version of their model that allows them to study labor adjustment at the extensive as well as at the intensive margin. Consistent with the SVAR evidence shown in their paper, Michelacci and López-Salido (2007) , p 1198, find that "in response to a neutral technology shock, employment falls but, as some jobs adopt the more advanced technology and working hours adjust, the number of hours worked per employee increases. This composition effect makes aggregate hours worked respond little to neutral technology shocks, which can explain why their contribution to the volatility of hours worked appears to be small in the data." In order to relate to those results, two observations might be in order. First, the SVAR evidence in Michelacci and López-Salido (2007) differs from the evidence we are referring to throughout the present paper, namely the results presented in Michelacci (2010, 2012) . In fact, those more recent papers clearly identify a decrease in labor input along both margins, which is consistent with our theoretical results in the present paper. The number of caveats that applies to any empirical analysis that seeks to identify the dynamic consequences of economic shocks is never small, and it is not uncommon that the data do not speak with a single voice. It is, however, also possible that the difference in empirical results is explained by the following methodological observation made in Canova, López-Salido, and Michelacci (2012) , p 516), "As in Blanchard and Quah (1989) and in Fernald (2007) , we recognize that low-frequency movements could give a misleading representation of the effects of shocks. This is a relevant concern as the growth rate of labour productivity and of the relative price of investment goods exhibit significant long-run swings which have gone together with important changes in unemployment and labour market flows." Our second observation regards the above-mentioned explanation of the small size of the contribution of neutral technology shocks to the volatility of hours worked. In fact, from the New Keynesian perspective adopted in our paper, it is possible to think of an alternative explanation of the small quantitative role of neutral technology shocks for labor market dynamics. We will come back to this point in the next subsection. Before we turn to this, it is also useful to put our results into another perspective. In fact, there is an ongoing discussion in the literature on how to match the high employment, low hours per worker volatility in the data (see, e.g., Clerc 2018) . While the evidence presented in Michelacci (2010, 2012) suggests that the combined effect of the technological shocks under consideration is a quantitatively important driving force of labor market variables at business-cycle frequencies, it should also be noted that a proper analysis of questions pertaining to the unconditional volatility found in the data would require the use of a model featuring (at least) some additional economic shocks. For instance, Sveen and Weinke (2008) demonstrate the importance of demand factors in accounting for labor market dynamics.
Robustness
How sensitive is our analysis with respect to variations of the baseline parameter values? Let us start by showing that the main economic mechanism analyzed in this paper relies on demand-constrained firms setting prices in a staggered fashion. The reason is that labor adjustment to technological shocks along both margins will only be conducted according to the incentives analyzed above, if a firm has a limited ability to affect demand over the planning horizon for a long-term employment decision. In fact, to the extent that prices are fully flexible, labor market variables react very little to technological shocks. This is illustrated in Figure 3 and Figure 4 , where the (annualized) real interest rate is now reported instead of inflation. Figure 4 , the response of the labor market variables is relatively muted compared with the corresponding outcome in the baseline version of our model. This is in line with some of the findings in Sveen and Weinke (2008) . They point at the importance of demand shocks in accounting for labor market dynamics, and the quantitative importance of those shocks is enhanced by price stickiness, as analyzed there.
Let us now have a closer look at the labor market frictions. Our model combines a cost of posting vacancies with a hiring cost that depends on the size of the labor adjustment along the extensive margin. But how do the economic mechanisms discussed in the present paper depend on the size of the hiring cost? We show next how a simple price stickiness metric can be used to address this question. More concretely, we show that reducing the size of the hiring cost or the degree of price stickiness has very similar consequences for the implied dynamic consequences of technological shocks. Figure 5 shows the dynamic responses of the macro variables under consideration to a positive neutral technology shock. The dashed black line represents a case where the labor adjustment cost parameter, ϵ n , is set to a value close to zero, whereas the red solid line is associated with a low degree of price stickiness. More concretely, parameter θ is set to 0.3 in this case. This value implies an average expected life-time of a price of less than two quarters. For ease of comparison the figure also reproduces the baseline results and represents them by a blue solid line. Figure 6 displays the corresponding results for an investment-specific shock. Figure 5 and Figure 6 make it clear that a decrease in the value of the price stickiness parameter affects the dynamic responses of the variables in a way that is similar to the outcome that obtains under a very small labor adjustment cost. What is the economic reason? And why is this important? Sveen and Weinke (2005) had shown that firmspecific capital gives rise to some endogenous price stickiness, i.e., price-setters internalize the consequences of the chosen price for the marginal costs that are expected over the lifetime of the price. In the present model, employment is a firm-specific state variable, and it is therefore not surprising that the economic effects of a very small labor adjustment cost are analogous to the ones that are associated with a low degree of price stickiness. This is important because -when combined with our first observation on the quantitative importance of price stickiness for the main economic mechanism analyzed in this paper -it explains the small size of the fluctuations in labor market variables in the version of our model where the labor adjustment cost parameter, ϵ n , is set to a value close to zero. Table 1 shows the results of some additional robustness analysis. More concretely, we change the value of the capital adjustment cost parameter, ϵ ψ , and we also consider alternative forms of monetary policy by varying the values assigned to parameters τ π and ρ r . The results in Table 1 are obtained from the impulse responses to a neutral technology shock. In each case, the table reports the average employment share s N, x (defined above) where ∈ {4, 8, 12} indicates the number of quarters over which the average is calculated. For convenience, the results corresponding to the baseline case are also reported. The quantitative findings in Table 1 demonstrate that our results are robust with respect to variations in key parameters of our model. This conclusion is also confirmed by the results reported in Table 2, where the corresponding outcomes are computed from the impulse responses to an investment-specific technology shock. A final remark on the role of monetary policy might be in order. By fully stabilizing the price level, monetary policy can replicate the flexible price equilibrium allocation in the context of our baseline sticky price model. This is a standard result, which is often referred to as divine coincidence (see, e.g., Galí 2015, 103) . By increasing the size of policy parameter ϕ π , i.e., the responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to changes in inflation, the central bank can approximate that outcome in our model. 
Conclusion
Starting with a seminal contribution by Galí (1999) , the effect of technological shocks on labor input has been the focus of much recent research in macroeconomics. In particular, Michelacci (2010, 2012) have estimated the propagation of technological shocks on labor market variables by allowing adjustment along both the intensive margin and the extensive margin. More concretely, they estimate that in response to investment-specific shocks labor adjusts predominantly along the intensive margin, whereas for neutral shocks the largest share of the adjustment takes place along the extensive margin. The present paper shows that the empirical evidence described above can be explained in the context of a New Keynesian model featuring endogenous capital accumulation combined with labor market frictions. We therefore offer an alternative to the Schumpeterian economic mechanism developed in Michelacci and López-Salido (2007) . This is interesting, we believe, because our explanation combines features which are standard in the DSGE models that are nowadays routinely used by researchers inside and outside the academic world to analyze a wide range of issues related to business cycle fluctuations. Some recent work in Clerc (2018) studies the influence of various wage bargaining schemes on the response of the two margins of labor adjustment in a model driven by monetary and neutral technology shocks. Ultimately, structural econometric work will be needed in order to assess the relative quantitative relevance of those (and potentially other) economic mechanisms. To this end, some additional features would need to be incorporated into the present framework in order to make it sufficiently rich to be taken to the data. This is an avenue of our future research. In the light of the empirical evidence in Canova, López-Salido, and Michelacci (2012) it would be of particular interest to endogenize the rate of separations. In the present paper hours per worker is the only intra-temporal margin of labor adjustment. The distinction between the inter-temporal employment decision, on the one hand, and the intra-temporal nature of adjustment along the hours margin allows us to isolate a simple economic mechanism to explain the relative importance of the two margins of labor adjustment in response to the two alternative forms of technological shocks.
Linearizing and aggregating the law of motion of capital gives
and the first-order conditions associated with investment and capital can be log-linearized as
where the following relationship holds true
Aggregating the linearized law of motion of firm-level employment results in
where we have used the notation that a variable without a time subscript denotes the steady state value of that variable. Linearized search unemployment reads
Period unemployment is given by
Aggregating and linearizing the first-order condition for firm-level employment implies
where Δ is the difference operator and
The following relationships holds true
The real wage is given by
and
The real marginal cost reads
The following inflation equation is derived
where parameter κ is computed numerically using the method outlined in Woodford (2005) . Market clearing implies
and value added reads = + .
Last, monetary policy is given by
Appendix B Computational Algorithm
We posit rules for price-setting and for employment * ( ) =̂ * + 1̂−1 ( ) ,
wherê( ) ≡ ( ) ,̂( ) ≡ ( ) denote, respectively, firm i's relative price and its relative to average employment. We have also used the definitionŝ * ( ) ≡ * ( ) and̂ * ≡ * , where * is the average newly set price. Let us first impose stability. Invoking the pricing and employment rules, as well as the definition of the price index we obtain are inside the unit circle. Our goal is to find conditions for the unknown coefficients in the rules. To this end we first express key firm level variables (production, hours worked, capital and the real marginal cost) as a function of the two variables in the rules. We have
With those preparations at hand, we next consider the linearized equation for the relative to average employment at the firm level.
where ≡ (1− ) 1 . We therefore have
(1 + − ( 1 1 (1 − ) + 2 ) − 22 )̂( ) = ( 1 + 21 )̂( ) +̂− 1 ( ) ,
which imposes the following two constraints on the undetermined coefficients ξ 1 and ξ 2 in the employment rule 1 = 2 ( 1 + 21 ) , 2 = 1 1 + − ( 1 1 (1 − ) + 2 ) − 22 .
Last, we consider price-setting. We can write the newly set price chosen by firm i as followŝ * ( Using the above rules as well as the Calvo assumption we find + ( ) = 1̂+ −1 ( ) + 2 (̂ * ( ) − , + ) = 1 [ 1̂+ −2 ( ) + 2 (̂ * ( ) − , + −1 )] + 2 (̂ * ( ) − , + ) .
We therefore have Combining the last equations and invoking the Calvo assumption, i.e. noting that the average value of̂− 1 ( ) is zero in the group of time t price setters we havê * ( ) =̂ * + 1 1 − 41 − 42 2 1− 1 42 1 (1 − ) 1 − 1̂− 1 ( ) .
We can therefore impose the following condition on the unknown parameter in the pricing rule
The average newly set price readŝ * =
where ≡ (1 + ) (1 − 2 ) + 1 (1 − 2 ) .
Solving the last equation forward and invoking the linearized price index gives
where ≡ (1 − ) (1 − ) 1 .
For candidate parameter values which satisfy the stability requirement we therefore solve the following system
This pins down the coefficients ( 1 , 2 , 1 ).
Notes
1 For an overview of that literature, see Galí and Rabanal (2004) . 2 See Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995) . 3 See, e.g., Silva and Toledo (2009) and Yashiv (2000).
